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I. INTRODUCTION
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently clarified what
negligence claims are available to an injured tenant against a 
landlord.  A tenant may now pursue a claim against a landlord 
under both negligence per se and common law negligence theories 
when he or she alleges housing code violations.1  Previously, if an 
accident occurred as a result of a housing code violation, a
landlord could rely upon an official housing inspection report that 
did not reveal any violations to argue a lack of constructive notice
of the condition.2  The landlord’s lack of constructive knowledge 
allowed the landlord to avoid liability under both theories for 
injuries resulting from fire or housing code violations if the
† J.D. 1984, Georgetown University Law School.  Judge Connolly was
appointed to the Fourth Judicial District bench in 1998 and elected to a full term 
in 2000.  The author wishes to acknowledge and thank Nancy Ball, J.D. 2001, 
William Mitchell College of Law, for all the hard work she has done in helping the 
author write this article.
1. Gradjelick v. Hance, 646 N.W.2d 225, 232 (Minn. 2002).
2. Id. at 234.
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landlord relied upon the official inspector’s report.3
In Gradjelick v. Hance, a fire destroyed an apartment building 
and tenants brought a negligence action against the landlord based 
upon alleged housing code violations and common law
negligence.4  The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in the case
now requires courts to conduct separate analyses under both
negligence per se and common law negligence theories to
determine landlord liability when a housing code violation is
alleged.5  The practical effect of the decision could impose a duty 
upon landlords to re-inspect the premises, even if a building 
inspector or fire marshal had previously conducted an inspection 
and had found no code violations.  The decision also ensures that 
landlords cannot avoid liability for a dangerous condition on the 
premises that they may have created.
II. BACKGROUND
The general rule under Minnesota common law is that a 
landlord is not liable (owes no legal duty of care) to a tenant for 
damage caused by defective conditions existing on the premises at 
the time of the lease.6  Courts recognize four exceptions to the 
general rule.7  The continuing evolution of these exceptions has 
some arguing that the breadth of the exceptions has contributed to 
the “erosion of the entire common-law rule, as part of the decline 
of the concept of a lease as a conveyance . . . .”8
The first exception applies where there is a hidden and
3. Id.
4. Id. at 227.
5. Id. at 234.
6. Johnson v. O’Brien, 258 Minn. 502, 504-06, 105 N.W.2d 244, 246-47
(1960); Briemhorst v. Beckman, 227 Minn. 409, 417, 35 N.W.2d 719, 726 (1949); 
Oakland v. Stenlund, 420 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); Broughton v. 
Maes, 378 N.W.2d 134, 135 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985), petition for rev. denied (Minn.
Feb. 14, 1986).  “The rule was rationalized by the theory that a lease is a
conveyance, a sale for the term, to which caveat emptor applied.” MILTON R.
FRIEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON LEASES, § 10.101, at 607 (4th ed. 1997).
7. Broughton, 378 N.W.2d at 135. See also Oakland, 420 N.W.2d at 248.
8. FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, § 10.101, at 610.  Friedman also states that the 
basic rule is “under assault led by an emerging ‘poverty law,’ which gives indication 
of spreading into the entire field of lease law.” Id.  The rule initially began from a 
lease of agricultural land in which the landlord was absent and the tenant was the 
only one on the land. Id.  Since tenants are now often in short-term leases in non-
agricultural buildings, the tenant is not the sole tenant and cannot afford to repair 
the premises. Id.  Now, neither the tenant nor the landlord expects the tenant to 
repair the premises, despite a written lease to the contrary. Id.
2
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dangerous condition on the premises.  This exception imposes a 
duty of care on the landlord when the landlord is aware, or should 
be aware, of the hidden and dangerous condition, but the tenant 
remains unaware.9  The landlord need not have actual knowledge 
of the condition.  Instead, if he or she should have known of the 
danger and a tenant exercising due care would not have discovered 
it, then the landlord may be held liable.10 A landlord is not 
responsible, however, if the tenant is made aware of the dangerous 
and defective condition.11  Second, courts may impose liability on 
landlords for what is referred to as the common area exception.12
This exception states that the landlord owes a duty to see that the 
premises remaining in the control of the landlord are maintained 
in a safe condition for the tenant’s use.13  A third exception exists if 
the landlord leases the premises for purposes involving admission 
to the public.14  If so, then the landlord is liable for any defective 
conditions.15  Finally, an exception exists for any negligent repairs 
9. Broughton, 378 N.W.2d at 135.  Some of these exceptions also originated 
with the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §343,which states that:
[A] possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to 
his invitees by a condition on the land, if, but only if, he (a) knows or 
by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and 
should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such 
invitees, and (b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the 
danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and (c) fails to 
exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (1965).  The Restatement further states 
what the tenant may expect from the landlord.
[A]n invitee enters upon an implied representation or assurance that 
the land has been prepared and made ready and safe for his reception.
He is therefore entitled to expect that the possessor will exercise 
reasonable care to make the land safe for his entry, or for his use for 
the purposes of the invitation. He is entitled to expect such care not 
only in the original construction of the premises, and any activities of 
the possessor or his employees which may affect their condition, but 
also in inspection to discover their actual condition and any latent 
defects, followed by such repair, safeguards or warning as may be 
reasonably necessary for his protection under the circumstances.
Id. at §343, cmt. b.
10. Johnson, 258 Minn. at 504-06, 105 N.W.2d at 246.
11. Broughton, 378 N.W.2d at 136.
12. Nubbe v. Hardy Cont’l Hotel Sys. of Minn., 225 Minn. 496, 499, 31 
N.W.2d 332, 334 (1948) (discussing landlord liability for the failure to maintain 
areas of common use).
13. Id. See also Gradjelick, 646 N.W.2d at 231.
14. Broughton, 378 N.W.2d at 136.
15. Id. at 135.
3
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that the landlord performed on the premises.16
If any of these four exceptions to the general common law rule 
apply, a landlord may be liable to a tenant for damage caused as a 
result of a violation of a duty created under these exceptions.17  The 
Minnesota Supreme Court found the first two exceptions, for 
hidden and dangerous conditions and common areas, most
applicable in the Gradjelick case.18
Even if an exception to the general rule of landlord liability 
does not apply, the applicable statute or ordinance imposes a fixed 
duty of care, so its breach constitutes conclusive evidence of
negligence.19  Prior to the supreme court’s 2002 ruling, if there was 
an alleged violation of a housing or fire code, the case was typically 
decided under a negligence per se analysis “if the persons harmed 
by the violation were within the intended protection of the code 
and if the harm suffered was of the type the code was intended to 
prevent.”20  Under the negligence per se analysis, Minnesota
requires four elements be present:
(1) the landlord or owner knew or should have known of 
the code violation;
(2) the landlord or owner failed to take reasonable steps 
to remedy the violation;
(3) the injury suffered was the kind the Code was meant 
to prevent; and
(4) the violation was the proximate cause of the injury or 
damage.21
The district court in Gradjelick applied the negligence per se 
analysis as articulated by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Bills v.
Willow Run I Apartments.22
In Bills, the plaintiff was injured when he fell on an exterior 
landing outside his apartment building.23  The plaintiff sued the 
building owner alleging the handrails were in violation of the 
Uniform Building Code and this violation was a proximate cause of 
16. Id.
17. Gradjelick, 646 N.W.2d at 232 n.4.
18. Id. at 231.
19. Id. (citing Alderman’s, Inc. v. Shanks, 536 N.W.2d 4, 8 (Minn. 1995)). See
also Pac. Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548, 558-59 (Minn. 
1977).
20. Alderman’s, 536 N.W.2d at 8.
21. Bills v. Willow Run I Apartments, 547 N.W.2d 693, 695 (Minn. 1996).
22. Gradjelick, 646 N.W.2d at 234.
23. Bills, 547 N.W.2d at 693-94.
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his injuries. 24  A building inspector had inspected the landing prior 
to the accident, and did not report any violations, which led the 
district court to rule that the plaintiff had failed to show that the 
defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged 
defective condition.25  The Minnesota Supreme Court concluded 
that landlords lack actual notice of a code violation when they 
reasonably rely on an inspection report and, therefore, cannot be 
held negligent per se for code violations that the inspector did not 
include in his report.26
The Bills decision was one of several that limited instances of 
landlord liability.  The courts have narrowly interpreted negligence 
theories as they relate to landlord liability and the duties owed to a 
tenant.  In Funchess v. Cecil Newman Corp., the court found that no 
special relationship existed between a landlord and tenant that 
would give rise to a duty to protect the tenant from the criminal 
acts of third parties.27  The court of appeals had earlier stated that 
at common law, absent fraud, misrepresentation or an agreement 
to the contrary, “a landlord was not responsible to his tenant for 
injuries resulting from a defective condition on the premises.”28  In
fact, Minnesota law does not permit the imposition of strict liability 
against a landlord for a breach of the implied warranty of
habitability.29  Thus, Minnesota courts have generally taken a
narrow approach to landlord liability in numerous contexts.
III. THE GRADJELICK CASE
A. The Facts
In 1982, Leland Hance purchased a mixed-use building in 
Excelsior, Minnesota.30  During the period relevant to this case, a 
hardware store occupied the first floor of the apartment complex 
24. Id. at 694.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 695.
27. 632 N.W.2d 666, 674 (Minn. 2001). See generally Melissa Baer, Notes and 
Trends Real Property, Bench & Bar Minn. 34, 42 (Nov. 2001).
28. Meyer v. Parkin, 350 N.W.2d 435, 437 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (referencing 
Normandine v. Friedson, 181 Minn. 471, 474, 233 N.W. 14, 15 (1930), which was 
overruled in part by Johnson v. O’Brien, 258 Minn. 502, 507, 105 N.W.2d 244 
(1960)); LOUIS LEHR, PREMISES LIABILITY 3D PART II. CHAPTER 41 (2002).
29. MINN. STAT. § 504B.161; LEHR, supra note 28.
30. Gradjelick v. Hance, 646 N.W.2d 225, 227 (Minn. 2002)
5
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and nine residential apartments were located on the second floor.31
Leland and Patricia Hance, who owned the building, lived in 
Colorado and employed a manager to care for the property.32  The 
Gradjelicks and Connie Jo Klosterman were tenants in the building 
and occupied two separate units located directly across a common 
hallway from each other.33
On April 24, 1999, Ms. Klosterman worked late and stopped at 
a bar on her way home where she consumed several alcoholic
drinks.34  After leaving the bar, she returned to her building and 
attended a party in a nearby apartment, where she consumed 
several more drinks.35  Ms. Klosterman eventually left the party and 
returned to her apartment.36  Early in the morning of April 25, 
1999, Ms. Klosterman discovered a fire inside her apartment and 
she fled the building.37
The Gradjelicks awoke to the smell of smoke in their
apartment.38  Mrs. Gradjelick called 911, opened her bedroom 
window and waited for firefighters to arrive at the scene.39  Upon 
the arrival of the fire department, Mrs. Gradjelick escaped from the 
apartment first, by means of a rescue ladder.40  After watching his 
wife reach the ground safely, Mr. Gradjelick felt intense heat on his 
back and fell from the second floor window.41  He suffered a 
compound fracture of his leg and first degree burns to his back and 
legs.42  At the time of trial, his medical bills were in excess of 
$250,000 and the injuries affected his ability to work.43
A deputy state fire marshal concluded that the fire originated 
in Ms. Klosterman’s apartment on the sofa/sleeper where she had
apparently fallen asleep while smoking.44  It was later determined 
that Ms. Klosterman’s blood alcohol concentration level was 0.34 
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Gradjelick v. Hance, No. PI00-004430, slip op. at 4 (4th Dist. Ct. Minn., 
Sept. 18, 2000).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Gradjelick, 646 N.W.2d at 228.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Gradjelick v. Hance, No. PI00-004430, slip op. at 5 (4th Dist. Ct. Minn., 
Sept. 18, 2000).
44. Gradjelick, 646 N.W.2d at 228.
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and she was subsequently charged with negligent fire, a felony in 
Minnesota.45  The resulting property damage to the apartment
building was assessed at approximately $700,000.46
The Gradjelicks brought a negligence claim against both Mr. 
and Mrs. Hance and Ms. Klosterman.47  The claim against the 
Hances, as owners of the building, alleged that they had
maintained the building in a negligent and careless manner and 
that their negligence, along with Ms. Klosterman’s actions,
proximately caused Mr. Gradjelick’s injuries.48
Plaintiffs also alleged numerous violations of the fire and 
building code within the apartment building which had created 
dangerous conditions.49  Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that
Defendants failed to create a secure hallway during the conversion 
from commercial space to residential units.50  Experts hired by 
Plaintiffs and Defendant Klosterman noted several code violations,
and both experts concluded that, but for the violations, the fire 
could have been contained to Ms. Klosterman’s apartment.51
Plaintiffs, based on evidence obtained during discovery,
argued that Defendants were aware of the unsafe conditions
because they had performed repairs on the property.52  The 
Gradjelicks argued that the Hances should have known about the 
conditions “because the defects were numerous and obvious and 
that the Hances were directly involved with some of the defects, 
including the installation of the electrical system for the smoke 
detectors and repairing a window in the Gradjelicks’ apartment.”53
45. Id.
46. Gradjelick, No. PI00-004430, slip op. at 4.
47. Gradjelick, 646 N.W.2d at 228.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 228-29.
50. Id. at 229.
51. Id. at 228; Gradjelick v. Hance, 627 N.W.2d 708, 710 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2001).
52. Gradjelick, 646 N.W.2d at 229. Among other improvements, the Hances 
had the electrical system hardwired in 1997 and fire detectors installed in the 
common hallway. See Appellants’ Brief, at 3.
53. Gradjelick, 646 N.W.2d at 230.  The Appellants claimed that attaching the 
smoke detectors eighteen inches below the ceiling, instead of at the ceiling level, 
caused the detectors to untimely detect the smoke. See Appellants’ Brief at 7.  It 
was this improper installation that gave notice to the Hances of a dangerous 
condition, thereby giving them constructive knowledge of the condition. Id.
(citing Wolvert v. Gustafson, 146 N.W.2d 172, 173 (Minn. 1966) for the
proposition that a landowner has constructive knowledge if the dangerous
condition is the result of the landowner’s actions).
7
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Moreover, Plaintiffs argued that Defendants knew or should have 
known of these dangerous and hidden conditions because
Defendants owned the building both before and after the
conversion from office space to apartments.54
In response, Defendants moved for summary judgment.55  The 
Hances claimed that they lacked actual or constructive knowledge
that the rental property was unsafe or that any building or fire code 
violations existed at the time of the fire.56  In support of their 
position, the landlords cited a fire marshal’s annual report, dated 
three months prior to the fire, which reported that the fire marshal 
did not observe any code violations or hazards on the premises.57
The landlords further argued that they lacked independent
knowledge of any hazards on the premises because they lived out of 
state at the time of the fire and that residents never notified them 
of any existing hazards.58 The Gradjelicks challenged summary 
judgment by claiming, “the Hances could not rely on the
inspection report revealing no violations because the Hances were 
directly involved with the defective conditions.”59
B. The District Court’s Analysis
The landlords sought summary judgment in this case, arguing 
that they had no actual or constructive knowledge of the fire code 
violations.60  The issue before the court centered on whether there 
were disputed issues of fact as to whether Defendant landlords 
breached a duty owed to Plaintiffs that was the proximate cause of 
Mr. Gradjelick’s injuries.61  The court ultimately found no genuine
54. Gradjelick v. Hance, No. PI00-004430, slip op. at 5 (4th Dist. Ct. Minn., 
Sept. 18, 2000).
55. Gradjelick, 646 N.W.2d at 229.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 229-30.  The city of Excelsior adopted the 1997 Uniform Fire Code 
in 1998. Id.  The fire marshal stated that the “city interprets the code to require 
that nonconforming structural conditions in buildings that existed when the code 
was adopted be corrected only upon commencement of new construction.” Id.
The marshal also stated that “he looks for conditions that can be corrected 
without construction activity.” Id.  When the fire marshal inspected the landlord’s 
building three months before the fire, he found “no code violations that could be 
corrected without construction activity and issued the multiple dwellings permit.”
Id. Additionally, the fire marshal “prepared a one-page summary of his inspection
in which he indicated ‘No Hazards Observed.’” Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 229.
61. Id. at 230.
8
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issue of material fact existed as to whether Defendants knew or 
should have known of any code violations that may have existed on 
their property.62  Even if the conditions existed as Plaintiffs alleged, 
the fire marshal’s report failed to denote them.63  Defendants’
reliance on this report was construed to demonstrate a lack of 
constructive knowledge of the code violations or any hazardous
conditions.64  The district court therefore granted summary
judgment on the grounds that the landlord had reasonably relied 
on an official building inspector’s report.65  Since the most recent 
report stated there were no fire code violations at the apartment 
building, the court found that the landlords lacked the requisite 
notice to impose liability.66
The district court ruling reiterated the general rule that 
landlords are “not liable to tenants for damage caused by 
defective conditions existing on the premises at the time of the 
lease”67 absent one of the four exceptions of negligence per 
se.68
The district court concluded that Plaintiffs failed to show that 
Defendants knew or should have known of any fire code violations, 
which was a “crucial element to the plaintiff’s claim under
Minnesota law.”69
The district court’s decision relied heavily on Bills v. Willow 
Run I Apartments, which held that if a landlord or owner reasonably 
relies on a state building inspection report, the landlord cannot be 
held negligent per se for an uncited violation of that code.70  The 
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Gradjelick v. Hance, No. PI00-004430, slip op. at 8  (4th Dist. Ct. Minn., 
Sept. 18, 2000) (citing Oakland v. Stenlund, 420 N.W.2d 248 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1988) and Broughton v. Maes, 378 N.W.2d 134 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986)).
68. Gradjelick, No. PI00-004430, slip op. at 9 (citing Broughton, 378 N.W.2d at 
135); see supra note 21 and accompanying text.
69. Gradjelick v. Hance, No. PI00-004430, slip op. at 10.
70. Bills v. Willow Run I Apartments, 547 N.W.2d 693, 695 (Minn. 1996).
Bills was injured when he fell on an exterior landing outside his apartment 
building. Id. at 693-94.  Plaintiff sued the building owner alleging the handrails 
were in violation of the Uniform Building Code and this violation was a proximate 
cause of his injuries. Id. at 694.  The building inspector had inspected the landing 
prior to the accident, which led the district court to rule that Plaintiff had failed to 
show that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the alleged
defective condition. Id.  The Minnesota Supreme Court found that the landlord
9
Connolly: Landlord/Tenant Law—Code Violations under Negligence Per Se and C
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2003
CONNOLLY FORMATTED.DOC 2/7/2003 2:40 PM
1022 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:3
district court found the Bills case factually similar to the case before 
it.71  The Minnesota Supreme Court concluded in Bills that
landlords lack actual notice of a code violation when they
reasonably rely on an inspection report.72  The district court
followed the precedent established by Bills and found that the 
landlords did not have a duty to re-inspect the building after the 
fire marshal’s inspection report and the issuance of the multiple 
dwellings permit.73  The district court granted summary judgment 
based on Plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate that Defendants knew or 
should have known of the alleged violations as required by the Bills
decision.74
C. The Court of Appeals’ Analysis
The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the 
district court.75  According to the decision, a landowner relying on 
an official inspection report lacks constructive knowledge of code 
violations and, therefore, cannot be liable in an ordinary
negligence action or in an action based on a negligence per se 
theory.76
The heart of Plaintiffs’ appeal was that the district court 
applied the wrong legal standard in granting Defendants’ motion
for summary judgment.77  Plaintiffs argued that while Bills may 
relieve the landlords from liability under a negligence per se 
theory, it did not preclude a separate analysis under ordinary 
negligence.78  The court of appeals disagreed.79
The court interpreted the Bills decision as a modification of 
the negligence per se doctrine in relation to landlord/tenant law.80
The court of appeals stated that the supreme court had adopted a 
standard that linked negligence per se and “common law
landlord/tenant standards [finding liability when the
landlord/landowner knew or should have known of a danger] into 
reasonably relied upon the inspection report. Id.
71. Compare id. at 694-95, with Gradjelick, No. PI00-004430, slip op. at 11.
72. Bills, 547 N.W.2d at 695.
73. Gradjelick, No. PI00-004430, slip op. at 11.
74. Id. at 7.
75. Gradjelick v. Hance, 627 N.W.2d 708, 713 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 712.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 713.
80. Id.
10
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one that defines a fair and just result.”81  In addition, the court 
rejected Plaintiff’s argument that a separate analysis must occur
stating: “[w]e are unable to articulate a principled distinction 
between per se and common law negligence theories for the 
purposes of this analysis.”82  In other words, according to the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals, if “the facts alleged failed to fulfill the 
knowledge requirement under negligence per se theory, identical 
facts asserted as common law negligence likewise fail.”83
IV. THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT DECISION
The Gradjelicks appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court, 
stating that the lower courts applied an erroneous legal standard 
and that genuine issues of fact were in dispute with respect to the 
landlords’ knowledge of defective conditions.84  Apparently
agreeing, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed and remanded 
the case.85  Although the supreme court did not find fault with the 
lower courts’ analysis with respect to negligence per se, the justices 
remanded the case given the failure to apply the correct legal 
standard to the separate ordinary negligence claim.86
The supreme court took issue with the trial court’s
interpretation of Bills and its failure to consider the elements of 
common law negligence in a separate analysis.87 According to the 
Bills decision, actual or constructive knowledge of the code
violation is still a required element in a negligence per se claim 
based on such violations, but this knowledge is not a required 
element in a common law negligence claim.88  Instead, under the 
hidden and dangerous condition exception to the general standard 
of landlord liability, plaintiffs must show a landlord’s actual or 
constructive knowledge of the hidden and dangerous condition, which 
may or may not be a code violation.89  The practical effect of this 
ruling is that the liability standards for ordinary negligence and for 
negligence per se should be kept separate in the analysis of a case.90
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Gradjelick v. Hance, 646 N.W.2d 225, 230 (Minn. 2002).
85. Id. at 234.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 232-33.
88. Id. at 233.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 234.
11
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Indeed, the court noted, “separate analysis is necessary under each 
theory because the elements are different.”91
The Minnesota Supreme Court also found that the district 
court “failed to consider other exceptions upon which landlord 
liability can be founded in ordinary negligence, including the 
‘common area’ and ‘negligent repair’ exceptions.”92  Neither of 
these exceptions requires actual or constructive knowledge of a 
code violation.93  Additionally, a claim for ordinary negligence 
requires only the elements of duty, breach, causation and
damages.94  The supreme court emphasized that a defendant is 
entitled to summary judgment “when the record reflects a
complete lack of proof on any of the four essential elements of the 
claim: (1) the existence of a duty of care, (2) a breach of that duty, 
(3) an injury, and (4) the breach of the duty being the proximate 
cause of the injury.”95 Actual or constructive notice of a code 
violation does not enter into the analysis.96
The court’s opinion found that the lower courts had erred in 
interpreting and applying the Bills decision.97  The court concluded 
that the Bills case should be applied to code violations only under a 
negligence per se analysis.98  However, the court noted that the Bills
case did not mandate that code violations must only be analyzed
under a negligence per se theory.99  Instead, analyses under 
91. Id.  Compare Bills v. Willow Run I Apartments, 547 N.W.2d 693, 695 (Minn. 
1996) (articulating that a landlord will not be held liable for negligence per se 
unless the plaintiff can show:
(1) the landlord or owner knew or should have known of the code 
violation;
(2) the landlord or owner failed to take reasonable steps to remedy the 
violation;
(3) the injury suffered was the kind the Code was meant to prevent; 
and
(4) the violation was the proximate cause of the injury or damage.)
with Lubbers v. Anderson, 539 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Minn. 1995) (stating the requisite
elements of negligence as  the existence of a duty of care, a breach of that duty, an 
injury, and the breach of duty being the proximate cause of the injury).
92. Gradjelick, 646 N.W.2d at 233.
93. Id.
94. Hudson v. Snyder Body, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 149, 157 (Minn. 1982).
95. Gradjelick, 646 N.W.2d at 230 (citing Lubbers v. Anderson, 539 N.W.2d 
398, 401 (Minn. 1995)).
96. Gradjelick, 646 N.W.2d at 233.
97. Id. at 232.
98. Id. at 234. Bills v. Willow Run I Apartments, 547 N.W.2d 693, 693 (Minn. 
1996).
99. Gradjelick, 646 N.W.2d at 234; Bills, 547 N.W.2d at 693.
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negligence per se according to Bills and ordinary common law 
negligence are both available in landlord liability cases when code 
violations are alleged.100
V. ANALYSIS OF THE GRADJELICK DECISION
The Minnesota Supreme Court correctly reversed both the 
district court and the court of appeals in a decision that could 
affect the future of landlord/tenant law in at least two ways.  First, it 
is now clear that two theories of landlord liability exist in a
negligence action when code violations are alleged.  Second,
depending upon the interpretation given, the decision could either 
signal a new direction for the Minnesota Supreme Court in
landlord liability cases, one which expands recovery options for 
tenants, or as merely clarifying existing causes of action.
The clarification of the required analysis in negligence actions 
involving housing code violations is perhaps the most important 
result of the Gradjelick case.  The supreme court was careful to 
delineate the knowledge requirements under negligence per se 
and common law negligence as that seemed to be an area of 
confusion for the lower courts.  While actual or constructive
knowledge of code violations is required under a negligence per se 
claim based on building code violations under Bills,101 actual or 
constructive knowledge of a code violation is not a required
element in an ordinary negligence claim.102  Rather, under the 
hidden dangerous condition exception to general standards of 
landlord liability set forth in Breimhorst v. Beckman, plaintiffs are 
required to show a landlord’s actual or constructive knowledge of a 
hidden, dangerous condition.103  As the Minnesota Supreme Court 
noted, hidden and dangerous conditions may include, but are not 
limited to, code violations.104
In contrast to the finding of the court of appeals, the supreme 
court made a principled distinction between per se and common 
law negligence theories.  Knowledge of code violations only applies 
in negligence per se cases, which was clearly the situation in Bills.105
When code violations are alleged, the negligence per se analysis 
100. Gradjelick, 646 N.W.2d at 234.
101. Bills, 547 N.W.2d at 695.
102. Hudson v. Snyder Body, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 149, 157 (Minn. 1982).
103. 227 Minn. 409, 419, 35 N.W.2d 719, 726 (1949).
104. Gradjelick,  646 N.W.2d at 233.
105. Bills, 547 N.W.2d at 693.
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cannot supplant the separate analysis required under ordinary 
negligence law in evaluating claims by tenants against landlords.106
In short, the Gradjelick decision allowed the Minnesota Supreme 
Court to clarify the necessary analytical process in negligence cases 
where housing code violations are alleged.  Furthermore, the 
decision also enabled the court to prevent the continued
misapplication of the Bills decision.107
The Minnesota Supreme Court ruling follows the general 
trend of other states as well.108  The Supreme Court of Delaware 
106. Gradjelick, 646 N.W.2d at 232.
107. See, e.g., In re Shigellosis Litigation, 647 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2002).
108. See generally Newton v. Magill, 872 P.2d 1213, 1214 (Alaska 1994) (holding
that the traditional common law rule that a landlord is generally not liable for 
dangerous conditions in leased premises no longer applies in view of the
legislature’s enactment of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act); 
Gore v. People’s Sav. Bank, 665 A.2d 1341, 1348 (Conn. 1995) (“[a]lthough the 
common law imposes on landlords only a duty to maintain in a reasonably safe 
condition those areas of their premises over which they exercise control, statutes 
may impose on landlords additional duties or obligations.”); Mansur v. Eubanks, 
401 So.2d 1328, 1330 (Fla. 1981) (holding that after the tenant takes possession, 
the landlord has a continuing duty to exercise reasonable care to repair dangerous 
defective conditions upon notice of their existence by the tenant, unless waived by 
the tenant); Stephens v. Stearns,  678 P.2d 41, 50 (Idaho 1984) (adopting the rule 
that a landlord is under a duty to exercise reasonable care in light of all the 
circumstances); Young v. Garwacki, 402 N.E.2d 1045, 1049 (Mass. 1980) (holding 
that landlords must exercise reasonable care not to subject others to an
unreasonable risk of harm); Houston v. York, 755 So.2d 495, 501 (Miss. Ct. App. 
1999) (making a landlord subject to tort liability merely requires him to act as a 
reasonable landlord under the circumstances of the case, but the tenant would 
still be required to show duty, breach, causation, and damages, and the landlord 
would be entitled to raise the standard tort defenses, such as contributory
negligence, unforeseeability or intervening cause); Lenz v. Ridgewood Assocs., 284 
S.E.2d 702, 705 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that a violation of statute
determining rights, obligations, and remedies under rental agreement for
dwelling unit does not constitute negligence per se, and the common law 
standards of ordinary and reasonable care in such cases, violation of statute being 
only evidence of negligence, are left intact); Turpel v. Sayles, 692 P.2d 1290, 1292 
(Nev. 1985) (holding that landlords, as other persons, must exercise reasonable 
care not to subject others to an unreasonable risk of harm); Shump v. First 
Continental-Robinwood Assoc., 644 N.E.2d 291, 295 (Ohio 1994) (“[t]he legal 
duty that a landlord owes a tenant is not determined by the common-law
classifications of invitee, licensee, and trespasser under the law of premises
liability; instead, a landlord’s liability to a tenant is determined by a landlord’s
common-law immunity from liability and any exceptions to that immunity that a 
court or a legislative body has created.”); Favreau v. Miller, 591 A.2d 68, 72 (Vt. 
1991) (holding that landlords may be held liable for exposing their tenants to 
unreasonable risks of harm in the leased premises, whether or not they retain 
“control” of the dangerous condition); Pagelsdorf v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 284 
14
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ruled that a plaintiff may pursue their claims under both ordinary 
negligence and negligence per se.109  The Delaware court stated 
that the landlord in its case was “mistaken in its argument that the 
Landlord Tenant Code precludes claims for ordinary
negligence.”110
This decision may be viewed as a departure from the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s generally conservative approach to 
landlord liability.  Unlike their decisions in Funchess111 and Meyer,112
this opinion appears to be moving toward providing additional 
theories under which an injured tenant may recover.  Some may 
interpret the decision as marking a new direction in landlord 
liability because it expands (rather than retracts) the theories of 
recovery available to an injured tenant.  On the other hand, the 
decision could be interpreted as a mere corrective measure, which 
prevented further misapplication of the Bills decision and clarified 
the standards for negligence cases involving housing code
violations.
The decision should be viewed as a corrective measure and a 
necessary outcome to clarify the current state of landlord liability in 
Minnesota.  The supreme court did not add a new cause of action 
to the area of landlord liability; it merely articulated the difference
between existing claims.  Indeed, were the Minnesota Supreme 
Court to have ruled the other way, it would have only further 
muddied the waters in landlord liability law by confusing cases 
involving code violations with cases where hidden, dangerous
conditions are alleged.
VI. CONCLUSION
While at first glance, Gradjelick v. Hance113 may seem to provide 
tenants with a new way to defeat a landlord’s defense of reliance on 
inspection reports in a negligence case, it does not.  Rather, the 
N.W.2d 55, 61 (Wis. 1979) (holding when a person lawfully on the premises is 
injured as a result of the landlord’s negligence in maintaining the premises, he is 
entitled to recover from the landlord under general negligence principles).
Compare Webster v. Heim, 399 N.E.2d 690, 692 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (refusing to 
adopt the rule of reasonable care in place of the common law rule of non-liability
of landlords for injuries to tenants).
109. New Haverford P’ship v. Stroot, 772 A.2d 792, 797 (Del. 2001).
110. Id. at 798.
111. Funchess v. Cecil Newman Corp., 632 N.W.2d 666 (Minn. 2001).
112. Meyer v. Parkin, 350 N.W.2d 435 (Minn. 1984).
113. 646 N.W.2d 225.
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case is more likely to be viewed as a mere clarification of the causes 
of action that already existed.  Though the Minnesota Supreme 
Court remanded the case to the district court for further findings, 
it suggested that the court had applied the correct legal standard 
with respect to the negligence per se theory.114  However, it wanted 
the district court to conduct a separate analysis under common law 
negligence.115
Landlords may still argue they lack constructive knowledge of 
any code violation by relying on fire marshal inspection reports 
that do not turn up any such code violations and thus defeat a 
negligence per se claim.  However, the supreme court has made 
clear that they could not successfully use the same argument to 
defeat a separate common law negligence claim if the tenants can 
point to a separate duty that was breached.
114. Id. at 235.
115. Id.
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